Co-Investment and Carry Arrangements at PE Firms
Co-investment and carried interest are the two primary financial instruments through which senior professionals at private equity firms — and the executives who manage their portfolio companies — participate in investment returns. Understanding the mechanics, tax treatment, and negotiation dynamics of these arrangements is essential for any senior executive operating in the PE ecosystem, whether as a fund professional or as a portfolio company management team member. For investors, see our portfolio company CEO recruitment service.
This guide explains how co-investment and carry arrangements work at UK PE firms, how they are structured for different seniority levels and firm types, the UK tax treatment (including the carried interest reforms that took effect in April 2025 and April 2026), and the specific considerations for executives joining PE firms or portfolio companies where these instruments are a central component of their compensation. It complements the companion Sweet Equity for PE Management Teams guide, which covers portfolio company management equity specifically.
The short answer
- Carry is the fund manager’s share of fund profits — classically 20% — paid only after investors have had their capital back plus a preferred return.
- Co-investment is personal capital invested alongside the fund. It is a return on your own money at risk, not a profit share, and is taxed differently.
- UK tax from 6 April 2026: carried interest is taxed as deemed trading profits under income tax and Class 4 NICs. For qualifying carry only 72.5% is taxable, giving an effective rate of about 34.1% for an additional-rate taxpayer. In 2025/26 carry was taxed as a capital gain at 32%.
- Qualifying carry depends mainly on the fund’s average holding period: 40 months or more qualifies in full, 36 to 40 months qualifies in part, under 36 months does not qualify.
- Waterfall, vesting and leaver terms often matter more than the headline percentage. A European (whole-of-fund) waterfall pays later but carries less clawback risk than an American (deal-by-deal) one.
- Portfolio company executives usually get sweet equity under a management incentive plan, not fund carry. Separate rules apply, including the Section 431 election and Business Asset Disposal Relief.
A word of caution before the detail. The financial complexity of PE carry and co-investment arrangements is matched by the career complexity of navigating them. Senior executives transitioning into PE roles — from corporate careers, from advisory positions, or from portfolio company management teams — frequently underestimate both the upside potential and the terms risk of these instruments. Carry allocations that sound generous in absolute percentage terms can produce modest actual returns if the fund underperforms; carry arrangements with high preferred return hurdles and strict good/bad leaver provisions can be worth less than they appear. Independent financial and tax advice before accepting any carry or co-investment arrangement is not optional.
Carried Interest: The PE Profit Share
Carried interest — commonly called “carry” — is the PE fund manager’s share of the fund’s profits above a defined preferred return threshold (the hurdle rate). Carry is the primary long-term compensation instrument for senior PE fund professionals, and it is the mechanism through which successful PE careers generate the transformational personal wealth that makes the PE industry attractive to ambitious finance professionals.
The classic carry structure is 20% of profits above the hurdle rate (“20 over the hurdle”). The hurdle is a preferred return on invested capital set out in the fund documents; HMRC’s own guidance on the tax treatment of carried interest uses a worked example of 20% carry over a 7% annualised preferred return, and buyout funds commonly use a single-digit rate of this kind. In practice, the fund must first return all invested capital to LPs plus the preferred return before the fund manager receives any carry. Above the hurdle, the fund manager receives 20% of additional returns, with LPs receiving the remaining 80%.
Carry is allocated among the fund team through a carry schedule — a document setting out each team member’s percentage of the carry pool, usually expressed in “points”. Senior partners hold the largest allocations, mid-level principals and directors hold meaningful but smaller allocations, and junior professionals hold small allocations or none at all; the precise split varies widely between firms and is rarely published. The carry schedule is one of the most commercially sensitive documents in a PE firm, and the negotiation of carry allocation when a senior professional joins or is promoted is one of the most consequential financial negotiations of their career.
European vs American Waterfalls
The distribution waterfall is the order in which cash from exits is paid out between LPs and the carry holders. Two models dominate, and the government’s own June 2025 consultation response on carried interest refers to both: the “whole of fund” model (usually called European) and the “deal-by-deal” model (usually called American). Most waterfalls run through the same four steps — return of capital, preferred return, a GP catch-up, then the 80/20 split — but the two models apply those steps at different levels.
| Feature | European (whole-of-fund) | American (deal-by-deal) |
|---|---|---|
| When carry is paid | Only after LPs have received all drawn capital across the fund plus the preferred return | After each individual exit, once that deal (and usually any realised losses) has cleared the hurdle |
| Timing for carry holders | Later — often well into the second half of the fund’s life | Earlier — cash can flow from the first successful exit |
| LP protection | Strong — carry cannot be paid on early winners that are later offset by losers | Weaker — relies on escrow and clawback to correct overpayment |
| Clawback risk for individuals | Low, though clawback provisions still usually exist | Higher — early distributions may have to be repaid if later deals underperform |
| Where it is used | Widely used by UK and European buyout funds | More common in US funds, single-asset vehicles and some co-investment structures |
| UK tax point to watch | Average holding period measured across the fund’s investments | Holding period test may be applied to the single asset, which can be harder to meet |
For an individual weighing an offer, the waterfall model changes the value of the same headline carry percentage. Deal-by-deal carry gives earlier cash but more risk of having to hand some back; whole-of-fund carry gives later cash with more certainty once it arrives. Many funds also use hybrids — for example, deal-by-deal distributions subject to a fund-level “fair value” test or a large escrow — so read the limited partnership agreement rather than relying on the label.
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Worked Example: An Illustrative Carry Waterfall
The figures below are illustrative only. They are not market data and are simplified to show the mechanics: management fees, fund expenses, the GP’s own commitment and the timing of drawdowns are ignored, and the preferred return is assumed to have accrued to a round figure. Real waterfalls are set out in the fund’s limited partnership agreement and are usually more complex.
Assumptions: a buyout fund draws and invests £500m. Over its life the investments return £1,000m in total, a 2.0x gross multiple and £500m of profit. The fund has a whole-of-fund (European) waterfall, a 20% carry and a full GP catch-up, and the preferred return accrued on LP capital comes to £235m by the time capital is returned.
| Waterfall step | To LPs | To carry holders | Cash left |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Return of drawn capital | £500m | – | £500m |
| 2. Preferred return | £235m | – | £265m |
| 3. GP catch-up (100% to carry until it holds 20% of profits paid so far) | – | £58.75m | £206.25m |
| 4. 80/20 split of the balance | £165m | £41.25m | £0 |
| Total | £900m | £100m |
Because of the full catch-up, the carry pool ends up with exactly 20% of the £500m profit (£100m). Without a catch-up, the carry holders would only share in profits above the hurdle, and the pool would be smaller. That single clause can move the value of a carry allocation materially, which is why candidates should check it rather than assume it.
The individual’s share. Suppose a director joining the firm is allocated 5% of the carry pool (again, purely illustrative). Their gross carry is £5m, received some years after the fund closes. Under the UK regime that applies from 6 April 2026, if all of the carry is qualifying carried interest, 72.5% of it (£3.625m) is treated as trading profit and taxed at 45% income tax plus 2% Class 4 NICs for an additional-rate taxpayer, giving roughly £1.70m of tax — an effective rate of about 34.1%. If the carry were wholly non-qualifying, the full £5m would be taxed at 47%, roughly £2.35m. For comparison, the same carry arising in 2025/26 would have been taxed as a capital gain at 32%, or £1.6m. Personal allowance withdrawal, Scottish rates, permitted deductions and any foreign tax are ignored here.
The deal-by-deal contrast. Take the same £500m fund but with an American waterfall, investing £250m in each of two deals. Deal A exits early for £500m; deal B later returns only £100m. On a deal-by-deal basis, the carry holders could receive around £50m of carry on deal A as soon as it exits. But across the whole fund only £600m comes back on £500m invested — £100m of profit, less than the illustrative preferred return of £235m — so on a whole-of-fund view no carry is earned at all. Under clawback, the carry holders would have to give back what they received on deal A, often capped at the after-tax amount. That is the clawback risk in one example, and it is why early carry distributions should not be spent as if they were final.
Co-Investment at the Fund Level
Fund-level co-investment — the ability of PE firm professionals and certain LP investors to invest alongside the fund in specific deals at fund terms — is an important supplement to carry for PE firm professionals. Co-investment provides direct economic exposure to individual portfolio companies rather than the diversified fund exposure that carry provides, and can generate significant returns from successful deals independently of the fund’s overall performance.
The right to co-invest is negotiated at fund closing and is set out in the fund documents. Senior professionals at established PE firms typically have the right to commit a defined amount to co-investment opportunities, either deal by deal or through an annual allocation; the size of that allowance varies by firm and seniority and is often linked to compensation. The co-investment is made at fund terms (the same entry price, the same deal economics) rather than at a discount, but it benefits from the fund’s operational oversight and the same governance rights as the fund’s own investment. Many firms also require team members to fund part of the GP’s own commitment to the fund, which is a form of co-investment in its own right and is often financed by firm-arranged loans.
UK Tax Treatment of Carried Interest
The UK tax treatment of carried interest has been the subject of significant HMRC scrutiny and legislative change. Historically, carried interest was treated as a capital gain — subject to CGT rather than income tax — reflecting the argument that carry is a profit share from investment activity rather than a reward for employment services. Before 2015, some PE professionals also benefited from base-cost shift arrangements and from the non-domicile rules, which allowed carry arising from offshore funds to be sheltered from UK tax in some cases.
The legislation introduced in 2015 and amended in subsequent Finance Acts changed that position materially. “Disguised investment management fees” — arrangements that economically function as management fees rather than profit participations — are treated as income. HMRC’s Investment Funds Manual explains that a sum is only carried interest if it is a genuine profit-related return that varies substantially with the fund’s profits. The income-based carried interest rules then taxed carry as income where the fund’s average holding period was short, and only carry from funds holding investments for at least 40 months on average kept full capital treatment. Until 5 April 2025, qualifying carry was taxed at special CGT rates of 18% and 28%.
2025/26: a 32% CGT rate
From 6 April 2025, the two CGT rates for carried interest were replaced by a single rate of 32%, as set out in the government’s policy paper on carried interest CGT rates. This was an interim step for one tax year only.
From 6 April 2026: deemed trading profits under income tax
From 6 April 2026, carried interest moved out of the CGT regime entirely. Under the revised tax regime for carried interest, enacted in Schedule 11 to the Finance Act 2026, an individual who receives carried interest is treated as carrying on a trade, and the carry is treated as the profits of that trade. It is therefore subject to income tax and Class 4 National Insurance contributions. The key points:
- The 72.5% multiplier. For qualifying carried interest, only 72.5% of the qualifying profits is brought into charge. For an additional-rate taxpayer paying 45% income tax and 2% Class 4 NICs, that produces an effective rate of about 34.1% (72.5% × 47% = 34.075%).
- Non-qualifying carry is taxed in full as trading profit, so an additional-rate taxpayer pays income tax and NICs on 100% of it.
- The average holding period test. Whether carry qualifies depends on the average holding period of the fund’s investments. Schedule 11 sets the qualifying proportion at 0% where the average is under 36 months, rising in steps of 20% for each additional month, to 100% at 40 months or more.
- No minimum co-investment or carry holding period. The government consulted on both and, in its June 2025 policy update, confirmed it would not introduce either.
- Employment-related securities. The previous exclusion for carry held as employment-related securities from the holding period test has been removed, so employees and LLP members are tested on the same basis.
- Territorial scope. The regime applies to UK-resident individuals and, in some cases, to non-residents whose carry relates to investment management services performed in the UK. The government expects some non-residents to be taxed on UK carry for the first time, and the rules include specific workday thresholds and exclusions, so internationally mobile executives need specialist advice.
- Payments on account. Because carry is now within income tax self assessment, payments on account can apply, which matters for cash flow in the years after a large distribution.
Budget 2026
Budget 2026, published on 28 October 2026, did not change the carried interest rates or the 72.5% multiplier. Two announcements are relevant to PE professionals and management teams. First, the government will require self assessment taxpayers who make payments on account to make more regular in-year payments from April 2029, which will affect anyone whose income includes large, irregular carry receipts. Second, the Business Asset Disposal Relief lifetime limit will fall from £1 million to £500,000 for qualifying disposals made on or after 6 April 2027, according to the government’s BADR lifetime limit policy paper. A new Founders’ Relief was also announced for qualifying disposals from 6 April 2027, but it is aimed at founders and early investors in high-growth companies, and its design was still out to consultation when this guide was updated.
BADR and carried interest
Business Asset Disposal Relief (formerly Entrepreneurs’ Relief) is often mentioned in the same breath as carry, but it does not reduce the tax on carried interest under the current regime, because carry is now taxed as trading income rather than as a capital gain. BADR remains relevant to shares held directly in a trading company — for example, management equity in a portfolio company — where the individual meets the conditions. Its rate has risen in stages: 10% for disposals before 6 April 2025, 14% for disposals from 6 April 2025 to 5 April 2026, and 18% for disposals on or after 6 April 2026, as confirmed on GOV.UK’s BADR guidance. The availability of BADR for any individual depends on the specific structure, the nature of the underlying company and the individual’s own qualifying conditions. Specialist tax advice from advisers with specific PE carry expertise is essential for any PE professional managing carry and co-investment returns.
Portfolio Company Co-Investment
Portfolio company co-investment — the ability of fund professionals to invest directly in portfolio company management equity alongside the management team — is offered at some PE firms as an additional incentive instrument. This gives deal team members who have driven specific transactions the opportunity to participate in the portfolio company’s equity return independently of their fund carry allocation.
Portfolio company co-investment is typically offered on the same terms as management sweet equity — at market value with the same hurdle and ratchet structure — and is subject to the same good leaver and bad leaver provisions as management equity. The tax treatment follows the employment-related securities framework applied to management sweet equity rather than the carried interest framework, and the Section 431 election mechanics discussed in the companion BADR and Section 431 guide apply equally to portfolio company co-investment held by fund professionals.
Carry Allocation by Seniority
There is no public dataset of UK carry allocations, so any precise percentages quoted for a given title should be treated with caution. What can be said with confidence is how allocation tends to work in practice and what drives it.
- Founding and managing partners hold the largest share of the pool, reflecting their role in raising the fund, their own capital commitment to the GP and their accountability to LPs. Founders of the management company may also take a share of management company profits, which is separate from carry.
- Partners and managing directors receive substantial allocations tied to the deals they lead and the funds they help raise. Allocations often step up from one fund to the next as they build a track record.
- Directors and principals usually receive their first meaningful carry at this level. The allocation is smaller and often subject to longer vesting, with larger awards in later funds dependent on promotion.
- Associates and analysts may receive a small allocation or none, depending on the firm. Some firms give junior staff a share of a separate pool or a deal-level bonus instead.
- Operating partners, CFOs, COOs and investor relations heads are increasingly included in carry plans, but the size of their allocation varies more between firms than it does for investment professionals. The operating partner role in particular can be paid through carry, retainer, portfolio equity or a mix.
Firms also hold back part of the pool as an unallocated reserve for future hires and promotions, and reallocate forfeited points from leavers. The general partner’s role in managing the fund explains why carry flows through the GP or a carry vehicle rather than directly from the fund. For salary and bonus context alongside carry, see our private equity salary guide.
Negotiating Carry Arrangements When Joining a PE Firm
The negotiation of carry allocation when joining a PE firm is one of the most commercially significant employment negotiations in finance. Key dimensions include: the percentage of the carry pool allocated; which fund or funds the carry relates to (existing fund, next fund, or both); the vesting schedule (most carry arrangements have a multi-year vesting period, with cliff and ratchet provisions); the good leaver and bad leaver definitions; and the escrow and clawback provisions that govern the timing and conditionality of carry distributions. Senior candidates joining PE firms should engage specialist legal counsel — with specific PE fund documentation experience — to review the carry documentation before signing.
Our private equity recruitment work shows that the questions candidates most often fail to ask are the practical ones: whether carry in the current fund is still available or already fully allocated, how much of the existing fund has been invested (and therefore how much upside is left), and whether the firm expects new partners to fund part of the GP commitment from their own pocket.
Further Reading
UK Private Capital (the trade body formerly known as the BVCA) publishes guidance on PE fund structures and carried interest. The HMRC Investment Funds Manual provides the technical framework for UK tax treatment of investment fund returns including carry. Related guides: Sweet Equity for PE Management Teams · BADR and Section 431 · PE-Backed Executive Hiring
Fund Structures and Carry Mechanics
Understanding the fund structure is essential context for evaluating a carry allocation. UK PE funds are typically structured as English Limited Partnerships with a separate General Partner (GP) entity that manages the fund, and carry is usually held through a separate carry partnership in which the individual team members are partners. The LP investors — pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, university endowments, family offices, and fund of funds — commit capital at fund close and draw it down as the GP identifies investments. The GP manages the portfolio and, after returning LP capital plus the preferred return, the carry vehicle receives carry on the remaining profits.
The timing of carry distributions — when fund professionals actually receive cash from their carry allocation — depends on the fund structure. Deal-by-deal carry (also called American waterfall) distributes carry after each individual investment exit, as long as the overall fund is performing above the hurdle at that point. European waterfall (fund-as-a-whole carry) distributes carry only after all LP capital across all investments has been returned plus the hurdle. European waterfall funds — widely used in UK and European PE — create a longer wait for carry distributions but provide LPs with greater protection against paying carry on early exits that are subsequently offset by later write-downs.
The clawback provision — which allows LPs to recover carry distributions already made if the fund’s final performance falls below the hurdle — is a standard feature of major PE funds. If carry has been distributed early in the fund’s life on the basis of favourable performance, and later investments underperform sufficiently to reduce the overall fund return below the hurdle, the GP may be required to return some or all of the carry previously distributed. This clawback risk creates specific financial planning considerations for PE fund professionals who have received carry distributions — maintaining liquid resources to meet potential clawback obligations rather than immediately investing all carry distributions in illiquid assets is standard risk management practice for experienced PE professionals.
Co-Investment Economics: The LP Perspective
LP co-investment — where the fund’s LP investors invest directly in specific portfolio companies alongside the fund, typically without paying the fund’s management fee or carry on the co-invested capital — is a major feature of the modern PE market. Large LPs, including major Canadian and US public pension plans, Gulf sovereign wealth funds such as the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, and the major European pension funds, run co-investment programmes that provide additional capital to the PE market at reduced cost.
GP co-investment — where fund professionals invest their personal capital alongside the fund — operates on different terms from LP co-investment. GP co-investment is typically at fund terms (the same valuation and economic structure as the fund’s investment), rather than at the fee-free, carry-free terms that major LP co-investments typically receive. The GP co-investment is still typically an attractive investment because it is made at the same price as the fund’s investment and benefits from the fund’s governance and management of the portfolio company; but it is not as favourable as some PE professionals expect when they first encounter LP co-investment terms.
Tax Planning for Carry and Co-Investment Returns
The interaction between carry distributions, co-investment returns, and the UK tax system creates significant planning considerations and risks for PE fund professionals. The most important include: confirming whether the fund’s average holding period will make carry fully qualifying, partly qualifying or non-qualifying, since that now drives the effective rate; keeping co-investment returns clearly separate from carry, because a genuine return on your own capital is generally taxed under the ordinary rules for that investment rather than the carried interest regime; the timing of carry receipts relative to the executive’s other income and to payments on account; the use of ISA and SIPP wrappers to shelter future investment returns from co-investment and carry proceeds; and the management of carry receipts in the context of the pension annual allowance taper for high earners.
PE fund professionals resident in the UK pay UK tax on their worldwide income and gains, including carry and co-investment returns from funds structured in other jurisdictions (Cayman, Delaware, or Luxembourg limited partnerships). The offshore income gains provisions, the anti-avoidance rules on transfers of assets abroad and the disguised investment management fee legislation all affect the tax treatment of different fund structures, and the 2026 regime adds its own territorial rules for non-residents. Specialist tax advice from advisers with specific expertise in UK PE fund taxation is essential for any PE professional managing significant carry and co-investment positions.
Exec Capital’s Financial Services and PE Firm Practice
Exec Capital’s practice covers senior appointments at PE firms and financial services businesses where carry, co-investment, and management equity structures are central to the compensation package. Our private equity executive search practice includes investment professionals (deal partners, directors, and associates at PE, VC, and growth equity firms), CFOs and COOs of PE firms and fund managers, chief investment officers, and senior portfolio company management team appointments where management equity is a primary component of the offer. Our understanding of the financial economics of PE compensation — including the carry allocation negotiation, the co-investment economics, and the tax implications — allows us to brief candidates accurately and to support both sides in the offer construction process. For the portfolio company management equity context, the companion Sweet Equity guide provides the relevant framework.
Carry Allocation Negotiation
The negotiation of a carry allocation when joining a PE firm is one of the most commercially significant negotiations in financial services. The key parameters are: the carry percentage (the individual’s share of the carry pool), which fund or funds the carry applies to, the vesting schedule, the escrow arrangements (how much carry is held back in escrow to cover potential clawback), and the good leaver and bad leaver definitions. Experienced PE professionals entering carry negotiations should engage specialist legal counsel — from firms with specific PE fund documentation expertise such as Travers Smith, Macfarlanes, or Clifford Chance — before signing any carry documentation. The difference between well-negotiated and poorly-negotiated carry terms can represent millions of pounds across a PE career.
The carry percentage is the most commercially significant parameter but also the most publicly sensitive — carry allocations within a PE team are typically not disclosed to other team members, and negotiating carry allocation requires discretion from both the candidate and the firm. Benchmarking carry allocation percentages against market practice is difficult because the data is not publicly available, and the candidate typically relies on their own judgment (informed by experience of prior carry negotiations if any), the specific advice of their legal counsel, and any market intelligence available through trusted advisers who have visibility into carry allocation norms at comparable firms.
Portfolio Company Management Equity and Fund-Level Carry
PE fund professionals who hold both fund-level carry and portfolio company co-investment positions manage two distinct equity instruments with different economic profiles. Fund-level carry provides diversified exposure across all the fund’s investments, typically vesting over the full fund life; portfolio company co-investment provides concentrated exposure to specific deals, realised at each individual deal’s exit. The combination creates a portfolio of equity positions with different return profiles, different vesting timelines, and different tax treatments — which requires active management and specific financial planning to optimise the after-tax outcome across all positions. For the portfolio company management equity context, the companion Sweet Equity guide covers the mechanics in detail.
Co-Investment for Portfolio Company Management vs Fund Executives
Executives often use “co-investment” to mean two quite different things. For someone joining a PE firm, it means investing personal capital alongside the fund. For someone joining a PE-backed business as CEO, CFO or COO, it usually means buying into the management equity of that one company. The economics, the tax and the risk are different, and it helps to keep them apart.
Portfolio company management: sweet equity and management incentive plans
In a typical buyout, the PE fund invests most of its money through loan notes or preference shares (the “institutional strip”) and a small amount through ordinary shares. Management is invited to buy ordinary shares at the same price per share as the fund — the “sweet equity” — which gives them a geared exposure to growth because the fund’s loan notes and preference shares sit ahead of the ordinary shares. A management incentive plan (MIP) sets out who gets what, how much each person pays, and what happens when people leave. Senior hires such as a portfolio company CFO or portfolio company COO are often expected to make a personal investment, sometimes described as “skin in the game”, as well as receiving an allocation of sweet equity.
Ratchets adjust management’s share of the equity depending on returns at exit. A positive ratchet increases management’s share if the fund achieves a set money multiple or IRR; a negative ratchet reduces it if returns fall short. Ratchets are tested on exit, so the measurement date, the definition of the fund’s return and the treatment of any follow-on investment all affect what management actually receives.
Tax. Management equity is usually employment-related securities. A joint election under section 431 ITEPA 2003, made no later than 14 days after acquisition, is commonly used so that future growth is taxed as a capital gain rather than as employment income. Gains on exit are then normally taxed at the main CGT rates, with BADR at 18% potentially available on the first £1 million of lifetime gains (falling to £500,000 for disposals from 6 April 2027) if the executive holds at least 5% of the ordinary shares and votes, meets the economic entitlement tests, is an officer or employee, and the company is a trading company, all for two years before the sale. Many management team members do not meet the 5% tests. EMI options are generally not available in PE-controlled companies because of the independence requirement, which Budget 2026 did not relax.
Fund executives: carry and personal co-investment
Fund executives receive carry across the fund, taxed under the 2026 regime, and may co-invest personal capital in the fund, in the GP commitment or in specific deals. A genuine co-investment return — one that reflects capital the individual has put at risk on arm’s length terms — is generally outside the carried interest rules, and the FCA’s remuneration guidance likewise treats co-investment returns differently from carry. The practical risk is blurring the two: where a “co-investment” is funded or priced on terms that a third-party investor would not get, part of the return may be taxed as carry or as employment income.
For an executive moving between the two worlds — for example, a portfolio company CFO hired into a fund as an operating partner — the move often means giving up unvested sweet equity and starting again in a carry plan with a long wait before cash. That trade-off needs to be modelled before an offer is accepted, and it is often where a buyout of forfeited deferred compensation comes into the negotiation. The executive equity and incentives guide sets these instruments alongside LTIPs and share options.
Carry Escrow and Clawback Management
Many PE funds withhold a portion of carry distributions in an escrow or holdback account to protect against future clawback obligations. The escrow amount is set in the fund documents and is held by the fund or its administrator until it is released to the carry recipients, either at fund wind-down or once it becomes clear that no clawback obligation will arise. For fund professionals who have received significant carry distributions, the escrow balance represents a meaningful deferred asset that is reflected in the fund’s ongoing financial reporting to LPs.
Managing the personal financial implications of the escrow — including when escrowed carry is treated as arising for tax purposes, the investment of the escrow balance while it is held, and the reporting of the escrow in the individual’s personal tax returns — requires specific financial planning. Depending on the structure and when the carry is treated as arising, tax may fall due before escrowed cash is released, so the carry recipient may need to fund tax on money they have not yet received and should treat the escrow balance as a contingent receivable until it is paid out. If a clawback subsequently requires repayment of carry on which tax has been paid, whether and how relief is available depends on the rules and the timing, which is one reason fund documents often cap clawback at the after-tax amount received.
Fund professionals who leave PE firms before carry is distributed — either by resignation, redundancy, or retirement — face specific escrow and clawback considerations. The good leaver provisions in the carry documentation typically allow departing fund professionals to retain their vested carry entitlement in the fund, subject to the escrow and clawback arrangements. However, carry distributions can arrive many years after the individual has left the firm, which creates tax and financial planning complexity that should be managed with specialist advice.
What Happens to Your Carry When You Leave
Leaver terms are where carry and management equity most often turn out to be worth less than the offer letter suggested. The detail differs by firm, but the same building blocks appear in most carry partnership agreements and MIPs.
- Vesting. Carry usually vests over several years, either in equal annual instalments or with a cliff followed by straight-line vesting. Some plans hold back a final tranche until the end of the fund’s investment period. Unvested carry is generally forfeited on leaving and returned to the pool.
- Good leaver. Usually covers death, ill-health, retirement by agreement and sometimes redundancy or dismissal without cause. A good leaver normally keeps vested carry and may keep some unvested carry on a time-apportioned basis.
- Bad leaver. Usually covers dismissal for cause, breach of restrictive covenants and, in many plans, resignation within a set period. A bad leaver may lose all carry, including vested carry. Check whether a voluntary resignation is treated as bad leaving — this is the clause that most affects a candidate considering a future move.
- Intermediate leaver. Some plans add a middle category with a partial forfeiture, often used where someone resigns but does not join a competitor.
- Restrictive covenants. Retained carry is often conditional on observing non-compete and non-solicit covenants, so a move to a rival fund can trigger forfeiture even after vesting.
- Sweet equity leaver terms. In a portfolio company, a bad leaver is typically required to sell shares back at the lower of cost and market value, while a good leaver receives market value or a time-based blend. Because sweet equity is often bought with the executive’s own money, the bad leaver price can mean losing part of the original investment.
Leaving also has tax consequences. Under the 2026 regime, carry that arrives after you have stopped working for the firm is still carried interest, and the territorial rules can bring carry into UK tax even after you have moved abroad, depending on where the work was done and how long you have been non-resident. Model the expected timing of carry receipts before deciding when to leave.
LP Co-Investment Opportunities: A Different Economic Profile
Limited Partner co-investment — where major institutional LPs invest directly in specific deals alongside the fund — has grown into a significant part of PE deal funding. From the GP’s perspective, LP co-investment provides additional capital for larger deals without requiring the GP to syndicate to other PE firms; from the LP’s perspective, it provides deal-specific exposure at reduced cost (typically fee-free and carry-free). This creates a different economic profile for co-invested capital than for capital invested through the fund: the LP co-investment return is the gross deal return, while the fund investment return is the gross deal return minus management fees and carry.
For large, successful PE transactions, the difference between co-investment economics and fund economics is material. As an illustration only: if a deal generates a 4x gross multiple, a co-investing LP on fee-free, carry-free terms keeps the full 4x on its directly co-invested capital, while the same LP investing through the fund receives a lower net multiple once management fees and the 20% carry are deducted. This economics differential is the primary commercial rationale for LP co-investment programmes, and it is why major LPs have invested heavily in their internal teams’ ability to assess, execute, and manage co-investment deals independently.
Fund professionals who move from GP roles to LP investment roles — joining pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, institutional endowments or family offices — find that co-investment is a significant part of their role. The skills required to assess co-investment opportunities — rapid deal evaluation, relationship management with GP sponsors, portfolio monitoring at the deal level — overlap significantly with the GP deal execution skills, making former PE fund professionals valuable to institutional LP teams building co-investment capability. The differences between family office and private equity roles are worth understanding before making that move, not least because LP-side pay rarely includes carry on the same scale.
Regulatory Requirements for Carried Interest in FCA-Regulated Firms
PE fund managers authorised by the FCA as full-scope UK AIFMs are subject to the AIFM Remuneration Code in SYSC 19B of the FCA Handbook, which affects how variable remuneration can be structured and paid to identified staff. The Code’s pay-out process rules include requirements for part of variable remuneration to be deferred and for at least 50% of variable remuneration to consist of units, shares or other instruments of the AIF concerned, subject to the fund’s legal structure.
How this applies to carry is more nuanced than is often assumed. The FCA treats carried interest plans as remuneration, except where the return arises solely from a co-investment. But the FCA’s guidance also recognises that, applying proportionality, a firm may disapply the pay-out process rules for carried interest where it can show that the arrangements align staff with investors and that appropriate clawback or make-up arrangements exist. Disapplication is never automatic: the firm has to assess each rule against its size, internal organisation and the nature, scope and complexity of its activities. FCA-regulated PE fund managers should take specific legal and compliance advice on how their carry structure interacts with the Remuneration Code, and should build this analysis into their fund documentation at fund close rather than addressing it reactively when distributions are due.
Negotiating Co-Investment Rights as a New PE Hire
Co-investment rights — the ability to invest personal capital alongside the fund in specific deals — are a negotiated benefit that varies significantly between PE firms and between seniority levels within a firm. Senior partners at major PE firms have well-established co-investment rights documented in their partnership agreements or employment contracts; mid-level and junior professionals at the same firms may have access to a smaller co-investment budget, or may access co-investment through a managed vehicle rather than direct deal-level participation. New senior hires joining PE firms should negotiate their co-investment rights explicitly as part of their employment package — including the annual co-investment budget, the right of first offer on specific deal types, and the process for proposing and approving co-investment participation — rather than assuming these rights will be granted as part of the standard employment package.
The tax planning for co-investment returns — specifically the interaction between the deal return, the individual’s marginal income tax rate, the CGT regime, and BADR availability — should be addressed at the time the co-investment is made rather than at exit. Fund professionals rarely meet the BADR conditions on fund-level co-investment, because they are not usually officers or employees of the portfolio company and seldom hold 5% of its shares; BADR is more relevant to portfolio company management with larger direct stakes. The companion BADR and Section 431 guide provides the full framework for understanding when and how BADR applies to different forms of PE-related equity participation.
The PE compensation ecosystem — combining base salary, annual bonus, fund carry, portfolio company co-investment, and in some cases LP co-investment opportunities — creates one of the most financially complex total compensation packages in professional life. Managing these instruments as a coherent personal financial portfolio — with appropriate diversification, tax planning, and liquidity management — requires specialist financial advice from advisers with specific PE compensation expertise. The financial planning considerations extend beyond the investment decisions to the estate planning implications of significant carry and equity wealth accumulation, the insurance requirements for key person risk, and the pension planning that must be managed alongside the equity and carry programme. Exec Capital’s senior appointments practice maintains relationships with specialist financial advisers who work with PE professionals and can provide referrals to appropriate advisers for executives managing complex PE compensation portfolios.
Negotiating Carry and Equity When Hiring into a PE Firm or PE-Backed Business
Whether you are the candidate or the hiring firm, carry and equity negotiations go better when both sides work from the same list of questions. These are the points we see make the biggest difference to how an offer is valued and accepted. Our executive offer construction guide covers the wider package.
Joining a PE firm
- Which funds? Ask whether the allocation is in the current fund, the next fund or both. Carry in a largely invested fund carries less risk but less upside; carry in an unraised fund depends on fundraising succeeding.
- Points and pool. Confirm the allocation in points and as a share of the total pool, and whether the pool is fully allocated or has a reserve that could dilute you later.
- Waterfall and catch-up. Whole-of-fund or deal-by-deal, the preferred return rate, and whether there is a full GP catch-up.
- Vesting and leaver terms. The vesting schedule, how resignation is treated, and what covenants attach to retained carry.
- GP commitment. Whether you are expected to fund part of the GP commitment, how much, and whether a loan is available.
- Tax profile. The fund’s expected average holding period, given the 36 and 40 month thresholds, and how the firm handles payments on account and tax distributions.
- Buyout of what you leave behind. Unvested carry or equity at your current employer, and whether the new firm will compensate for it.
Joining a PE-backed business
- Your share of the sweet equity and how it compares with the rest of the management team.
- What you must invest and at what price, and whether the price reflects the deal valuation or a later one.
- The capital structure above the ordinary shares — the coupon on loan notes or preference shares determines how much growth is needed before sweet equity has value.
- Ratchet targets and how fund returns are measured.
- Leaver provisions, especially the price on resignation.
- Section 431 election and who will arrange it within the 14-day window.
- Exit timing, the sponsor’s expected hold period, and what happens on a secondary buyout.
For the hiring firm
For a PE firm or portfolio company hiring, the most common reason a strong candidate walks away is not the size of the allocation but uncertainty about it. Set out the waterfall, vesting and leaver terms early in the process, give candidates time to take advice, and be ready to explain the expected timing of distributions. A clear term sheet before final interviews is more persuasive than a generous number with vague conditions. Through our PE hiring practice we brief candidates on these terms before they reach final stage, which reduces late-stage drop-outs.
Frequently asked questions
What is the difference between carried interest and co-investment?
Carried interest is a share of the fund’s profits paid to the manager for managing the fund, usually without the individual putting in matching capital. Co-investment is the individual’s own money invested alongside the fund, and the return on it reflects that capital at risk. They are documented, taxed and regulated differently.
How is carried interest taxed in the UK now?
From 6 April 2026, carried interest is taxed under income tax and Class 4 NICs as deemed trading profits. Qualifying carried interest is reduced by a 72.5% multiplier, giving an effective rate of about 34.1% for an additional-rate taxpayer. Non-qualifying carry is taxed in full.
What was the carried interest tax rate in 2025/26?
For carried interest arising between 6 April 2025 and 5 April 2026, the CGT rate was 32%. Before that, carry was taxed at 18% or 28% depending on the individual’s income.
What makes carried interest “qualifying”?
Mainly the average holding period of the fund’s investments. At 40 months or more the carry qualifies in full; between 36 and 40 months it qualifies in part, in 20% steps per month; below 36 months it does not qualify. Specific rules apply to credit funds, funds of funds and some single-asset structures.
Did Budget 2026 change carried interest tax?
No. Budget 2026 left the carried interest regime and the 72.5% multiplier unchanged. It did announce more regular in-year payments for self assessment taxpayers who make payments on account from April 2029, a cut in the BADR lifetime limit to £500,000 from 6 April 2027, and a new Founders’ Relief that is unlikely to apply to most PE management teams.
Is Business Asset Disposal Relief available on carry?
Not under the current regime, because carry is taxed as trading income rather than as a capital gain. BADR can apply to shares in a trading company where the conditions are met, at 18% for disposals from 6 April 2026.
What is the difference between a European and an American waterfall?
A European waterfall pays carry only after LPs have received all their capital across the fund plus the preferred return. An American waterfall pays carry deal by deal, so carry arrives earlier but may have to be repaid through clawback if later deals disappoint.
What is clawback?
Clawback is the obligation on the GP and carry holders to repay carry already distributed if the fund’s final results show they were overpaid. It is usually backed by an escrow of part of each carry distribution and is often limited to the after-tax amount received.
Do I lose my carry if I resign?
Usually you lose unvested carry. Whether you keep vested carry depends on the leaver definitions: many plans treat resignation within a set period as bad leaving, which can mean losing some or all vested carry too. Read the carry partnership agreement before you sign, not when you decide to leave.
Do portfolio company executives get carry?
Rarely. Portfolio company management teams are normally incentivised through sweet equity and ratchets in the company they run, not through the fund’s carry. Some operating partners and senior advisers are given a share of fund carry, but that is a separate arrangement.
Hiring a senior executive where carry or equity is part of the offer?
Exec Capital places investment professionals, fund leadership and portfolio company executives across the UK, with carry and management equity built into the brief from the first conversation.
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About the author
Adrian Lawrence FCA is the founder of Exec Capital. He is a Chartered Accountant holding an ICAEW practising certificate in his own name, with more than 25 years’ experience operating at C-suite level. His background spans private equity-backed businesses, owner-managed companies and listed environments, giving Exec Capital a practitioner’s understanding of what senior leadership hires actually require. View Adrian’s ICAEW profile.