LTIP Structures at UK Listed Firms
Long-term incentive plans (LTIPs) are the primary mechanism through which UK listed companies align senior executive pay with long-term shareholder value creation. The design of the LTIP — the performance conditions, the vesting period, the award level, and the post-vesting holding period — is one of the most consequential remuneration decisions a listed company makes, affecting both the quality of the executives the company can attract and retain and the degree to which executive pay is genuinely linked to the performance that shareholders care about.
This guide explains the mechanics of UK listed company LTIP structures, the performance conditions most commonly used and their governance implications, the Investment Association and proxy adviser frameworks that shape what institutional investors accept, and the specific LTIP design considerations for newly listed companies building their first remuneration framework. It draws on Exec Capital’s experience of senior executive appointments at FTSE-listed and AIM-listed businesses where LTIP design is a central component of the offer package.
From the desk
What candidates actually ask about LTIPs
As a former listed-company Finance Director, I have seen how LTIPs look to the executives receiving them. Senior candidates moving between listed companies rarely ask about the headline percentage first. They ask about the performance conditions, the vesting and holding periods, and what happens to unvested awards if they leave.
Boards that can explain their LTIP clearly, including how often it has actually paid out, have a real advantage in senior recruitment. We ask clients for that history before we approach candidates, because the strongest ones will check it themselves.
Adrian Lawrence FCA, Founder, Exec Capital
LTIPs at UK listed companies: the short answer
If you need the position in a few lines, it is this. A UK listed company LTIP is normally an annual award of shares (conditional shares or nil-cost options) to executive directors and senior management that vests after three years, subject to performance conditions, and is then held for a further two years. That gives the five-year combined vesting and holding period the UK Corporate Governance Code expects. Awards carry malus and clawback, the remuneration committee can override formulaic outcomes, and the whole framework sits inside a shareholder-approved remuneration policy.
- Performance share plans (PSPs) remain the default structure at most FTSE 350 companies.
- Restricted share plans (time-vesting, no performance conditions) are accepted where a company can justify them, usually with an award size roughly half that of a PSP.
- Hybrid plans, mixing performance shares and restricted shares, are now expressly recognised by the Investment Association following its October 2024 revision of the Principles of Remuneration, mainly for companies with substantial US exposure or global talent competition.
- Tax: for a listed company, the value of shares at vesting or exercise is normally taxed as employment income through PAYE, with employee and employer National Insurance; later growth falls within capital gains tax.
- Hiring: an incoming executive’s forfeited awards are usually bought out with like-for-like LTIP or restricted awards, inside the recruitment section of the remuneration policy.
For boards appointing the people who design and oversee these plans, our listed companies non-executive recruitment practice covers remuneration committee members, chairs and independent directors at FTSE and AIM companies.
The Standard UK LTIP Structure
The standard UK listed company LTIP follows a consistent structure: shares are awarded annually to eligible executives (typically CEO, CFO, and other executive directors) at a level set as a percentage of base salary; the shares vest three years after award date subject to the satisfaction of performance conditions; vested shares are subject to a further two-year holding period before they can be sold; and the total award is subject to malus (reduction before vesting) and clawback (recovery after vesting) in specified circumstances.
The three-year performance period and two-year holding period create a five-year “pay-for-performance window” that is designed to align executive pay with the longer-term performance that shareholder value creation requires. Provision 36 of the UK Corporate Governance Code says that share awards granted to promote long-term shareholdings should be released for sale on a phased basis and be subject to a total vesting and holding period of five years or more, and that the remuneration committee should develop a formal policy for post-employment shareholding requirements. These requirements are now standard across FTSE 350 companies.
Annual LTIP award levels vary by company size, sector, and the competitiveness of the total remuneration package. Larger companies generally grant higher awards as a percentage of salary than smaller ones, the CEO normally receives a higher percentage than the CFO and other executive directors, and the maximum is fixed in the shareholder-approved remuneration policy rather than set afresh each year. For newly listed companies, LTIP awards are often set at the more cautious end of the range for their market tier initially, with the remuneration committee communicating the intention to benchmark against a comparator group once the company has established its track record as a listed business. Candidates for CEO and CFO roles will normally ask to see the policy maximum, the normal grant level and the vesting history of recent awards before they take an offer seriously.
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Performance Conditions: Types and Their Governance Implications
Total Shareholder Return (TSR). Relative TSR — the company’s total shareholder return (share price growth plus dividends) compared to a defined comparator group of peer companies — is one of the most widely used LTIP performance conditions at UK listed companies. Its attractions are genuine: it measures the performance that shareholders directly experience, it is transparent and objectively verifiable, and the relative comparator group design controls for general market conditions that are outside management’s influence. Its limitations are also genuine: TSR is significantly affected by the starting valuation (a company trading at a low multiple at the beginning of the performance period will generate higher TSR than a comparable company starting at a high multiple, through multiple re-rating alone), and it reflects investor sentiment as much as operational performance.
Earnings Per Share (EPS) growth. Absolute EPS growth — the compound annual growth rate of the company’s earnings per share over the performance period — is the other most commonly used LTIP performance condition. EPS growth is more directly linked to the management team’s operational performance than TSR, provides a clear connection between executive pay and the financial delivery that drives long-term shareholder value, and is relatively simple to communicate to both executives and shareholders. Its limitations include sensitivity to accounting policy choices, the potential for EPS to be managed short-term at the expense of investment in long-term value creation, and the difficulty of setting the right EPS growth targets without creating perverse incentives.
Return on Capital Employed (ROCE) and Return on Equity (ROE). Capital efficiency metrics — measuring the return the business generates on its capital base — are increasingly used as LTIP performance conditions, particularly at capital-intensive businesses where the quality of capital allocation is a primary value driver. ROCE conditions reward management for generating high returns on the capital they deploy, not just for growing earnings without regard for the capital cost. This is particularly relevant for businesses that have made significant acquisitions or capital investments that need to be assessed on a risk-adjusted return basis.
ESG conditions. Environmental, Social, and Governance performance conditions — typically covering carbon reduction targets, employee engagement scores, diversity metrics, or safety performance — appear in many FTSE 350 LTIP schemes, usually as a minority weighting alongside financial and TSR measures. Investors generally support them where they are genuinely material to the company’s strategy and measured against quantified, verifiable targets, and they are sceptical of soft or hard-to-audit measures that look likely to pay out regardless of performance. A remuneration committee should be able to explain why each ESG measure matters to value creation, not simply that it is fashionable.
The Investment Association Remuneration Principles
The Investment Association publishes Principles of Remuneration that set out institutional investor expectations for listed company executive pay in the UK. These principles — which are the main reference point for remuneration committees designing or reviewing LTIP structures — cover: the overall quantum of executive pay (which should be proportionate to company size and performance), the structure of variable pay (which should be predominantly equity-based and aligned with long-term value creation), the performance conditions (which should be stretching, relevant to the strategy, and transparent), and the post-vesting holding requirements (which should align executive interests with long-term shareholder outcomes).
The Investment Association also runs the IVIS colour-coded alert system, which flags listed company remuneration reports and policies that contain provisions institutional investors have concerns about. A “red top” alert — indicating a provision that the IA considers contrary to its principles — is a strong signal that the company will face institutional investor opposition at its AGM say-on-pay vote. Remuneration committees should review their LTIP design against the IA principles before finalising their remuneration policy and should engage proactively with major shareholders if they are considering any provision that might attract IA scrutiny.
How the latest Investment Association Principles changed LTIP design
The IA published a substantially simplified version of its Principles on 9 October 2024, applying to the 2025 AGM season onwards. The stated aim was to support a competitive UK listing environment by moving from a list of quasi-rules to a set of principles that companies can apply to their own circumstances, with investors assessing proposals case by case. The full Principles of Remuneration document is short and worth reading in full, but the changes that matter most for LTIP design are these:
- Hybrid plans are recognised. Structures that combine performance shares with restricted (service-only) shares are acknowledged as potentially appropriate, particularly for companies with a large US presence or those competing for talent globally.
- No fixed limits on quantum. The Principles no longer set rigid caps; investors look at whether the total package is justified by the company’s size, complexity and strategy, and whether it is explained.
- Simpler dilution guidance. The separate 5% in ten years limit for discretionary schemes has gone; the 10% in ten years limit across all schemes remains, with some flexibility for recently listed high-growth companies that are expected to move back towards normal limits over time.
- Bonus deferral. The fixed expectation that bonus above 100% of salary is deferred has been replaced with a requirement for a deferral policy, with a lighter approach possible for executives who already hold significant shareholdings and where malus and clawback are adequate.
- Discretion in both directions. Upward discretion to reward exceptional achievement not captured by the metrics is now expressly contemplated, alongside the established downward discretion.
- Engagement over prescription. The IA expects early engagement with major shareholders on anything novel, and investment managers may also apply their own clients’ views on pay structure and size.
The IA has continued to write to remuneration committee chairs before each AGM season, including a letter in November 2025 ahead of the 2026 season. The practical effect is that a well-argued, clearly disclosed design now has more room than it did, but a poorly explained increase in quantum still attracts dissent.
UK Corporate Governance Code: Provisions 36 to 38
The 2024 edition of the UK Corporate Governance Code applies to financial years beginning on or after 1 January 2025 and operates on a comply-or-explain basis. Its remuneration section was largely carried over from the 2018 Code, with a sharper focus on malus and clawback. The provisions most relevant to LTIP design are:
- Provision 36: share awards should be released on a phased basis and be subject to a total vesting and holding period of at least five years, and the remuneration committee should have a formal policy on post-employment shareholding.
- Provision 37: schemes and policies should allow discretion to override formulaic outcomes and to recover or withhold sums or share awards in specified circumstances, and directors’ contracts and other remuneration documents should include malus and clawback provisions.
- Provision 38 (new in the 2024 Code): the annual report should describe the malus and clawback provisions, including the circumstances in which they could be used, the minimum period for which they apply and why that period is appropriate, and whether they were used in the last reporting period, with an explanation if they were.
The remaining remuneration provisions deal with pension contributions aligned to the wider workforce, notice periods of one year or less, and the factors the remuneration committee should address in its policy and report (clarity, simplicity, risk, predictability, proportionality and alignment to culture). AIM companies are not bound by the UK Code; most follow the QCA Corporate Governance Code, which is less prescriptive on LTIP mechanics but still expects a clear explanation of how pay supports strategy.
The UK versus US pay debate and the rise of hybrid plans
Since 2024, a recurring argument from UK boards has been that listed company pay is uncompetitive against US peers, making it harder to recruit and retain executives with global careers, and contributing to companies considering a US listing. The IA’s revised Principles were partly a response to that argument. Several large UK companies have since sought shareholder approval for higher variable pay opportunities or for hybrid plans that bring part of the award closer to US-style time-vesting equity.
Investor reaction has been mixed rather than hostile. Glass Lewis’s review of the 2025 UK season found ten FTSE 350 companies proposed hybrid plans, up from six the year before, with average support of around 76%, and suggested that much of the opposition reflected the accompanying increase in pay opportunity rather than the hybrid structure itself. It also found that the share of quantum increases justified by US competitiveness fell from about 30% in 2024 to about 11% in 2025. FTI Consulting’s analysis of the 2026 season found that investors generally expect restricted share awards to be discounted by around half compared with performance shares, and that some companies introducing restricted shares still met significant dissent even after applying that discount, typically over the rationale for switching.
The lesson for a remuneration committee is that the structure itself is no longer the main obstacle. What decides the vote is whether the company can show a genuine talent market reason for the change, whether quantum has been adjusted for the lower risk of time-vesting awards, and whether the shareholder engagement started early enough.
Proxy Adviser Methodology: ISS and Glass Lewis
ISS (Institutional Shareholder Services) and Glass Lewis publish UK-specific voting guidelines that assess listed company remuneration reports against their methodology and provide vote recommendations to institutional investor clients. A negative vote recommendation from ISS or Glass Lewis on the remuneration report or remuneration policy resolution significantly increases the risk of a failed say-on-pay vote, which is a material reputational event for the remuneration committee chair and the board.
ISS’s UK voting guidelines focus particularly on: the stringency of LTIP performance conditions and whether targets look sufficiently stretching against the company’s plan and consensus; the total pay quantum and any increases to it; and the governance of one-off awards (buyout awards, special retention awards, and other awards outside the standard LTIP framework that may indicate a governance concern). For 2026, ISS added an expectation that companies explain the treatment of departing directors and how many awards vested or lapsed, reflecting the IA position that bonus and LTIP awards should be paid to good leavers only. Glass Lewis applies similar principles with some differences in methodology, and the two advisers occasionally provide different vote recommendations on the same remuneration report.
LTIP Design for Newly Listed Companies
Newly listed companies designing their first LTIP face specific challenges that established listed companies do not. The company’s comparator group for relative TSR must be selected before the company has established its market position as a listed entity. The EPS growth targets must be set at a time when the market’s consensus forecast for the company’s earnings trajectory is not yet established. And the management team that negotiated pre-IPO equity — often with very generous terms by listed company standards — must transition to a listed company LTIP framework that institutional investors will assess against market norms rather than against what the management was previously receiving. The pre-IPO equity structuring guide covers how those earlier arrangements are usually unwound or rolled into the listed framework.
The remuneration committee chair at a newly listed company should commission a benchmarking report from a specialist remuneration consultant before the prospectus is finalised, covering: the LTIP award levels appropriate for the company’s size and comparator group; the performance conditions that are standard in the company’s sector; and the post-vesting holding requirements that institutional investors will expect. This benchmarking provides the foundation for a remuneration policy that can be disclosed in the prospectus and that will stand up to institutional investor and proxy adviser scrutiny from the first AGM post-admission. For the governance context, the SMF12 Remuneration Committee Chair guide covers the governance role in detail.
Shareholder approval: the UK Listing Rules and the Companies Act
Two separate approval regimes apply to an LTIP at a main market company. The first is the Companies Act 2006 requirement for a binding shareholder vote on the directors’ remuneration policy at least every three years, plus an annual advisory vote on the remuneration report. Payments to directors that are not consistent with the approved policy cannot lawfully be made without separate shareholder approval, which is why the policy needs to anticipate recruitment awards and buy-outs.
The second is the UK Listing Rules (UKLR), which replaced the old Listing Rules in July 2024 and merged the former premium and standard segments for commercial companies into a single equity shares (commercial companies) category. The continuing obligations require shareholder approval of new employee share schemes and long-term incentive schemes, with narrow exceptions, including one for an arrangement made specifically to facilitate, in unusual circumstances, the recruitment or retention of a director. The scheme rules themselves are therefore put to an AGM or general meeting, usually every ten years, separately from the policy vote. Market abuse rules also apply: directors and persons discharging managerial responsibilities must notify transactions, including awards and vesting, and grants are generally timed outside closed periods.
How Exec Capital Approaches Listed Company Senior Appointments
Exec Capital runs senior executive and board appointments at FTSE-listed and AIM-listed companies. Our listed company practice includes specific attention to the LTIP and remuneration package context — ensuring that candidates understand the equity incentive framework at the listed company they are joining and that the offer package is designed within the company’s remuneration policy framework. On the board side, our listed company NED searches regularly involve remuneration committee experience as a core requirement. Sister firm FD Capital specialises in CFO appointments where the LTIP package is a significant component of the total remuneration. For the board governance context, the Board Construction at Listed Companies guide provides the full framework.
Further Reading
The Investment Association Principles of Remuneration provide the main investor framework for UK listed company LTIP design. The ISS UK and Europe policy updates and Glass Lewis’s annual UK season reviews set out how the proxy advisers are applying their standards. For regulated firms, the PRA and FCA joint remuneration reform policy statement (PS21/25) sets out the current banking deferral rules.
Related guides: Executive Offer Construction · Executive Compensation Guide
Malus and Clawback: The Mandatory Recovery Framework
Malus — the ability of the remuneration committee to reduce or cancel unvested LTIP awards before vesting — and clawback — the ability to require repayment of vested and paid awards — are standard features of UK listed company LTIP schemes, expected by both the UK Corporate Governance Code (Provision 37) and the Investment Association Principles of Remuneration. Both mechanisms provide the remuneration committee with a financial sanction that can be applied in cases of significant misconduct or material misstatement, without the need for litigation.
The UK Corporate Governance Code does not set a fixed minimum period; instead, Provision 38 of the 2024 Code requires the company to disclose the minimum period for which malus and clawback apply and to explain why that period is appropriate. In practice, many companies apply clawback for at least two years after vesting or payment, and the triggers have widened in recent years beyond misstatement and misconduct to include serious reputational damage, failure of risk management and corporate failure. The remuneration rules for banks, building societies and other regulated firms impose more extensive requirements — including clawback periods of up to seven years from award, extendable for senior managers in some circumstances, and specific triggers covering conduct failures and material risk management failures. For regulated firms, those rules apply on top of the Corporate Governance Code, which typically means significantly more demanding malus and clawback frameworks at banks and other in-scope firms than at non-financial listed companies. The regime has also been loosened in places: under PS21/25, from October 2025 the minimum deferral period for all material risk takers, including senior managers, is four years.
In practice, malus and clawback are exercised rarely — the most significant UK examples have been at financial services firms following major regulatory failures and at companies that restated their accounts — but their existence is commercially significant because it affects the after-tax value of LTIP awards to executives. An executive who has paid income tax on vested LTIP shares, or CGT on their later disposal, may subsequently receive a clawback demand, and the tax already paid is not always recoverable in full. Executives managing significant unvested or recently vested LTIP positions should be aware of the malus and clawback framework in their employment contracts and should take tax advice on the implications of any exercise of these provisions.
Holding periods and shareholding requirements
The two-year post-vesting holding period is now close to universal at FTSE 350 companies, and it is usually supported by two further requirements. The first is an in-employment shareholding requirement, expressed as a multiple of salary, that executives must build up within a set period, normally by retaining vested shares after tax. The IA’s current Principles indicate that a director would usually be expected to meet the minimum requirement by retaining the equivalent of one year’s LTIP award. The second is the post-employment shareholding requirement expected by Provision 36, under which a departing executive keeps a proportion of the in-employment requirement for a period after leaving.
These rules matter at the hiring stage. A candidate moving from a private company or a US-listed business will often hold no shares in the new employer and will need to understand how long it will take to meet the requirement and whether the holding period applies to shares delivered as a buy-out. They also affect leavers: a good leaver’s outstanding awards are normally pro-rated and continue to the normal vesting date, and the holding period and post-employment requirement continue to run, so the executive remains exposed to the share price for several years after departure.
Discretion and the Remuneration Committee’s Exercise of Judgment
Provision 37 of the UK Corporate Governance Code expects remuneration committees to retain discretion to override formulaic outcomes, including LTIP vesting outcomes that would be “windfall gains” — situations where performance conditions are technically met but where the resulting vesting level does not reflect genuine underlying performance. This expectation — introduced following criticism that some management teams received very large LTIP payouts during periods of share price growth that was driven by general market conditions rather than company-specific outperformance — gives the remuneration committee the authority (and the obligation, in appropriate circumstances) to reduce LTIP vesting below the formula-calculated level. A common example is an award granted when the share price was depressed, where the committee assesses at vesting whether the number of shares granted produced an unwarranted gain.
The exercise of discretion to reduce vesting is one of the most challenging governance judgments a remuneration committee makes. Reducing an executive’s LTIP vesting below the formula-calculated level — even on the grounds of windfall gain — is a significant financial intervention that the executive and their advisers will challenge if they believe the performance conditions were genuinely met on their merits. The remuneration committee needs to be able to defend its exercise of discretion with specific, documented reasoning that explains why the formula outcome does not represent genuine pay-for-performance in the specific circumstances. The remuneration committee chair’s relationship with major institutional shareholders is particularly important when discretion is exercised in ways that deviate significantly from the formula outcome, and equally when the committee uses the upward discretion the IA now contemplates.
LTIP Design in Different Sectors
LTIP design norms vary significantly by sector, reflecting the different performance metrics that are most relevant to each industry and the different governance conventions that institutional investors apply. At banks and other firms within the scope of the PRA and FCA remuneration rules, LTIPs must meet specific requirements on deferral, vesting periods, payment in instruments and performance adjustment that go beyond the Corporate Governance Code provisions. At natural resources companies, commodity price exposure means that TSR and EPS performance conditions can be significantly affected by factors outside management’s control, leading some remuneration committees to place greater weight on return on capital employed or operational performance metrics. At technology companies — particularly those at growth stage where profitability is not yet established — revenue or ARR growth metrics may be more appropriate LTIP conditions than EPS, which may be negative in the early growth phase.
Newly listed technology and growth companies face specific challenges in LTIP design because their performance profile does not match the established norms of the FTSE-listed universe. A SaaS business listing on the London market with negative EBITDA but strong ARR growth needs LTIP performance conditions that reflect its specific value creation drivers — not the EPS growth and relative TSR conditions that were designed for mature businesses with stable earnings. Developing bespoke, sector-appropriate performance conditions that can be explained clearly to institutional investors and proxy advisers requires both remuneration committee sophistication and proactive engagement with major shareholders before the remuneration policy is finalised. These are also the companies most likely to argue for a hybrid or restricted share structure, because they compete with US technology employers for the same people.
Exec Capital’s Listed Company Senior Practice
Exec Capital’s listed company senior appointments practice covers C-suite and board-level appointments at FTSE-listed and AIM-listed companies. Our approach to listed company senior appointments includes specific attention to the LTIP and remuneration framework — ensuring that candidates understand the equity incentive structure and that the offer package is designed within the company’s remuneration policy framework. We work with remuneration committee chairs and company secretaries to develop LTIP-compliant offer packages that are competitive in the market while respecting the governance constraints that listed company remuneration requires. Where the board needs to strengthen the committee itself, our Remuneration Committee Chair recruitment service focuses on that appointment, including for regulated firms where the role is a senior manager function.
Share Plan Administration at Listed Companies
The administration of listed company share plans — the process of granting awards, tracking vesting, exercising options, and managing the regulatory and employment tax obligations — is a significant operational responsibility for the company’s Company Secretary and HR function. Major listed companies typically use specialist share plan administrators — Equiniti, Computershare, or SLC Registrars — to manage the award administration, vesting notifications, and dealing facilities that the volume of LTIP awards at a large company requires. The quality of the share plan administration process affects both the executive’s experience of the equity incentive scheme and the company’s compliance with Companies Act, HMRC, and Listing Rule requirements.
The HMRC Employment Related Securities returns — the annual online returns covering employment-related share awards — must be submitted by 6 July following the end of each tax year in which reportable events occur, such as awards being granted, vesting, being exercised or lapsing. These returns cover LTIP, option, and share scheme awards, and the data must be consistent with the award documentation and the company’s statutory share register. Errors or omissions in the ERS returns can attract HMRC enquiries and penalties, and the Company Secretary’s governance responsibility includes ensuring that the ERS return process is managed accurately.
International LTIP Issues
UK listed companies with operations in multiple jurisdictions face specific challenges in administering LTIP awards for non-UK employees. The tax treatment of LTIP awards varies significantly by country — in some jurisdictions the grant is a taxable event, in others the vesting, and in others the disposal — and the employment tax withholding obligations of the company (in its capacity as employer) in each jurisdiction need to be managed in compliance with local employment tax law. For large listed companies with employees in many countries, the administration of the international LTIP dimension is a substantial compliance exercise that requires specialist international share plan administration support. Internationally mobile executives add a further layer, because the taxable gain may need to be apportioned between countries according to where the executive worked during the vesting period.
The securities law implications of issuing listed shares to employees outside the UK also require specific management. Most major jurisdictions have exemptions from securities registration requirements for employee equity plans, but these exemptions typically have specific conditions — limits on the number of participants, limits on the amount of equity offered, requirements for specific disclosure documents — that the company must comply with. UK listed companies offering LTIP awards to US-based employees, for example, must comply with the SEC’s requirements for Form S-8 registration or rely on an applicable exemption, which requires specific legal analysis for each jurisdiction where employees are located.
Restricted Share Units vs Performance Share Plans
The two main LTIP structures at UK listed companies are Performance Share Plans (PSPs) — where shares vest subject to performance conditions over a three-year period — and Restricted Share Units (RSUs) or restricted share plans — where shares vest based on continued service and time, without performance conditions. PSPs remain the dominant structure at FTSE 350 companies, reflecting long-standing investor preference for performance-linked vesting. RSUs — which have been the dominant structure at US listed companies for many years — are increasingly accepted in the UK for specific circumstances: newly listed companies establishing their first equity incentive programme, companies in sectors where setting meaningful multi-year performance targets is genuinely difficult, companies competing with US employers for talent, and situations where the company is making a specific targeted retention award rather than an ongoing incentive grant.
Institutional investors still look harder at restricted shares without performance conditions than at PSPs. The IA’s 2024 revision removed the earlier sense that restricted shares were a departure needing special justification, and now recognises hybrid structures, but investors still expect a lower award level to reflect the lower risk, a clear rationale linked to strategy and talent, an underpin allowing the committee to reduce vesting if performance has been poor, and longer holding periods. Proxy advisers continue to scrutinise restricted share awards for executive directors closely. Remuneration committees considering RSU awards for executive directors should engage proactively with major shareholders before making such awards and should be prepared to explain why performance conditions are not appropriate in the specific circumstances.
Share matching plans — where executives invest their own cash in company shares and receive a matching award of shares that vest subject to performance conditions and continued holding of the investment shares — are a third LTIP structure that aligns executive incentives with shareholder interests through co-investment as well as performance. Share matching plans were more common in the 2000s and early 2010s than currently, but some listed companies retain them as part of their remuneration framework.
LTIP vs restricted share plan vs hybrid: comparison
The table below sets out the main practical differences between the three structures UK listed companies now use for executive directors. It describes typical market practice; the detail in any one company is set by its own remuneration policy and plan rules.
| Feature | Performance share plan (LTIP) | Restricted share plan | Hybrid plan |
|---|---|---|---|
| Vesting basis | Performance conditions over three years | Continued service, usually with a performance underpin | Part performance-tested, part service-based |
| Award size | Highest face value, high forfeiture risk | Investors generally expect around half the PSP level | Between the two, depending on the mix |
| Holding period | Two years after vesting (five years total) | Often longer, with phased release | Five years total as a minimum for both elements |
| Investor view | Default, widely supported | Accepted with a clear rationale and discount | Recognised by the IA; mainly for US-exposed or global talent cases |
| Executive view | High upside, uncertain outcome | Predictable value, closer to US practice | Balance of certainty and upside |
| Main risk | Targets too soft or unreachable | “Pay for tenure” criticism | Complexity and quantum creep |
Exec Capital and Listed Company Appointments
Understanding the LTIP framework at the specific listed company is an important part of offer construction for any listed company senior appointment. Exec Capital’s listed company practice includes specific attention to the total remuneration package — ensuring that candidates understand the LTIP in context alongside base salary, annual bonus, and pension — and that the offer is designed to be competitive in the market while respecting the remuneration policy constraints. For context on the post-IPO governance period when the first LTIP is typically designed, the companion Post-IPO Senior Hiring guide covers the broader remuneration governance transitions that occur around listing.
Deferred Annual Bonus and Its Relationship to the LTIP
At many UK listed companies, the annual bonus scheme includes a compulsory deferral element — a proportion of the annual bonus award is deferred into shares that vest after two or three years, subject to continued employment and malus provisions. Since the IA’s 2024 revision, the amount deferred is set by each company’s own deferral policy rather than a fixed investor threshold, and some companies apply lighter deferral to executives who have already met their shareholding requirement. This deferred bonus is distinct from the LTIP: it relates to the current-year annual performance that earned the bonus, not to a separate three-year forward-looking performance period. However, the deferred bonus shares and the LTIP shares accumulate simultaneously, and the total equity exposure of a senior executive includes both unvested LTIP tranches and unvested deferred bonus shares from multiple prior years’ bonus cycles.
Investors treat deferred bonus as part of the annual remuneration structure rather than as long-term incentive compensation. Deferred bonus shares that are subject to further performance conditions (beyond continued employment) are closer to LTIP-equivalent exposure; deferred shares with continued employment as the only condition are effectively deferred cash bonus paid in shares. This distinction affects how the total incentive exposure is assessed in the annual shareholder vote on the remuneration report.
For senior executives joining listed companies from PE-backed or private environments, the deferred bonus element of listed company remuneration is often unfamiliar. The mandatory deferral of a portion of each year’s bonus into shares — locked up for two to three years and subject to forfeiture on bad leaver departure — is a material change from the cash bonus culture of many private businesses and requires specific explanation in the offer package presentation to ensure candidates understand the full cash-flow implications of the listed company remuneration structure.
Using LTIPs to buy out awards on hire
Most senior hires at listed companies involve a candidate walking away from unvested equity: LTIP tranches, deferred bonus shares and, for candidates from private equity, sweet equity or management incentive plan interests. The hiring company normally compensates for what is forfeited through a buy-out award, and LTIP or restricted share awards are the usual vehicle. Our guide to buying out deferred compensation covers the valuation and negotiation in detail; the points specific to listed company LTIPs are these:
- Like for like. Investors expect a buy-out to be no more generous than what was forfeited, on broadly the same timetable and, where the forfeited awards were performance-tested, with comparable performance conditions or an appropriate discount.
- Inside the policy. Because payments to directors must be consistent with the approved remuneration policy, the recruitment section of the policy needs to permit buy-out awards. If the existing plan cannot be used, the narrow Listing Rules exception for awards made to facilitate the recruitment of a director may allow a one-off arrangement, with disclosure, but advisers should confirm this against the current rule text.
- Evidence. The committee will want documentary evidence of the forfeited awards, their vesting dates and any performance conditions, and a remuneration consultant’s view of their fair value.
- Disclosure and proxy scrutiny. Buy-outs are disclosed in the next remuneration report and are one of the first things ISS and Glass Lewis look at, so the rationale should be written with that audience in mind.
- Regular LTIP participation. Separately from the buy-out, the new executive normally joins the regular annual LTIP cycle, sometimes with a first award made at or shortly after joining.
For candidates, the critical questions are whether the buy-out replicates the value and timing of what they are giving up, how malus and clawback apply to the replacement award, and whether the holding period runs on the buy-out shares. Handled badly, a buy-out is the point where a listed company offer fails. Our executive equity incentives guide sets out how listed company awards compare with PE and private-company instruments when a candidate is weighing offers across ownership types.
How LTIP awards are taxed
LTIP awards at UK listed companies are usually structured as conditional share awards or nil-cost options and are not tax-advantaged. The broad UK position for a UK-resident executive is as follows, although the detail depends on the plan rules and individual circumstances, and specialist advice is always needed.
- Grant. No income tax is normally due when a conditional award or nil-cost option is granted.
- Vesting or exercise. Income tax is charged on the market value of the shares received when a conditional award vests, or on the gain when a nil-cost option is exercised. Because listed shares are readily convertible assets, the employer must operate PAYE and collect employee National Insurance, and pay employer National Insurance on the same amount. Executives commonly sell enough shares to cover the tax.
- Holding period. Tax is normally due at vesting even though the shares cannot yet be sold because of the holding period. Whether the restriction affects the taxable value depends on how it is structured, which is a point for the plan’s advisers.
- Dividend equivalents. Where a plan pays the value of dividends accrued during the vesting period, that amount is normally taxed as employment income at vesting.
- Later sale. Growth in value after vesting or exercise falls within capital gains tax, with the base cost equal to the value already taxed as income.
- Company deduction. The company can normally claim a corporation tax deduction for the amount taxed on the employee when shares are acquired, subject to the statutory conditions.
Some listed companies sit a tax-advantaged Company Share Option Plan alongside the LTIP, allowing part of an award to be structured as a CSOP option. HMRC’s guidance confirms the limit is £60,000 of shares per employee for options granted from 6 April 2023, with no income tax or National Insurance on the gain if the option is exercised between three and ten years after grant. Because the limit is small relative to executive director awards, a CSOP is usually a marginal enhancement rather than a different structure. Tax rates and reliefs change with each Budget, so offer documents should describe the mechanism and leave the numbers to the executive’s own tax adviser.
Questions an executive should ask about an LTIP offer
Executives considering a role at a listed company are often offered an LTIP as a large part of the package. These are the questions worth answering before accepting.
| Question | Why it matters |
|---|---|
| What are the performance conditions, and how stretching are they? | Decides whether the award is likely to vest at all |
| What happens if I leave: good leaver and bad leaver terms? | Decides what you keep if you move on |
| Is there a holding period after vesting? | Delays when you can sell |
| Are there malus and clawback provisions? | Awards can be reduced or recovered |
| Will a buy-out replace awards I lose by leaving my current employer? | Often a key part of the move |
Adrian says
Value the LTIP at what it is likely to pay, not the headline
As a former listed-company Finance Director, I saw how often LTIP awards were valued by candidates at their maximum. In practice, many vest only in part.
Ask for the vesting history of past awards at the company. It is the best guide to what yours is likely to be worth.
Adrian Lawrence FCA, Founder, Exec Capital
See private equity salary guide, co-investment and carry and sweet equity.
Frequently asked questions
What is an LTIP at a UK listed company?
A long-term incentive plan is a share-based award, usually made annually to executive directors and senior managers, that vests after three years if performance conditions are met and is then held for a further period. It is the main element of variable pay at most FTSE 350 companies.
How long is the vesting and holding period?
The usual structure is three years’ vesting plus a two-year holding period. Provision 36 of the UK Corporate Governance Code expects a total vesting and holding period of at least five years, with shares released on a phased basis.
What is a hybrid LTIP?
A hybrid plan combines performance shares with restricted shares that vest on continued service, usually with an underpin. The Investment Association’s revised Principles recognise hybrid plans as potentially appropriate, mainly for companies with substantial US exposure or global talent competition, and investors expect the restricted element to be smaller than an equivalent performance award.
What is the difference between malus and clawback?
Malus reduces or cancels an award before it vests or is paid; clawback recovers value that has already been paid or delivered. The 2024 Code expects both in directors’ contracts and requires the annual report to describe them, including the minimum period they apply for and whether they were used.
Do LTIPs need shareholder approval?
For main market commercial companies, yes in two ways: the plan rules need shareholder approval under the UK Listing Rules, and awards to directors must be consistent with the remuneration policy approved by shareholders under the Companies Act at least every three years.
How are LTIP shares taxed?
For a UK-resident executive, the value at vesting or exercise is normally taxed as employment income through PAYE, with employee and employer National Insurance. Any later increase in value is subject to capital gains tax on sale.
What happens to my LTIP if I move to another listed company?
Unvested awards normally lapse if you resign, so the new employer usually offers a buy-out award that broadly replicates the value, timing and conditions of what you forfeit, subject to its own remuneration policy and disclosure in its next remuneration report.
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About the author
Adrian Lawrence FCA is the founder of Exec Capital. He is a Chartered Accountant holding an ICAEW practising certificate in his own name, with more than 25 years at C-suite level, and a graduate of Queen Mary, University of London. His background spans private equity-backed businesses, owner-managed companies and listed environments, giving Exec Capital a practitioner’s understanding of what senior leadership hires actually require. View Adrian’s ICAEW profile.